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Abstract 
Human rights law faces a crisis of legitimacy, both in the UK and across much of the wider 
democratic world. A drumbeat of media criticism focusing on the alleged incompatibility of human 
rights norms with both ‘common sense’ and the principle of democratic self-government has grown 
louder, while sceptical voices can increasingly be heard in academia and elsewhere questioning 
whether the legal protection of human rights has ‘gone too far’. In response, rights enthusiasts have 
clung to old verities - proclaiming the importance of human rights law as a tool for maintaining the 
rule of law and reinforcing democracy, while treating rights sceptics with a stiff dose of dismissive 
disdain. However, they would be wise not to underestimate the scale of the legitimacy crisis now 
facing human rights, or fail to recognise the strength of some of the critiques coming their way. 
Defenders of existing human rights law need to be prepared to roll up their sleeves and make a 
serious case for the legitimacy of existing human rights law, if it is to survive the current crisis more 
or less intact.  
Setting the Scene 
The idea that human rights law is currently facing a legitimacy crisis may appear to some readers to 
be an exaggeration. Most democratic states remain committed to respecting human rights norms, at 
least at the level of formal compliance with the requirements of national and international law. 
Politicians may talk tough, but the day-to-day functioning of human rights law goes on: for example, 
the UK government’s manifesto commitment to replace the HRA with a ‘British Bill of Rights’ 
appears to be as far from being realised as ever, and the UK remains a party to the ECHR 
notwithstanding media and political grandstanding about the alleged judicial over-reach of the 
European Court of Human Rights. In general, the idea that national legal systems could include 
human rights guarantees enforceable by courts still attracts widespread academic, legal and popular 
support – even in a state such as the UK, where ‘human rights’ broadly defined have been in the 
media firing-line for a while now.   
However, if one steps back and takes a look at the wider historical and political context, it is 
apparent that human rights law has entered stormy waters. Its scope and content is increasingly 
contested, in a way that calls into question its fundamental legitimacy. This impending crisis may be 
contained, and ultimately pass. But rights enthusiasts would be wise to avoid complacency. The 
legitimacy challenges that human rights law is facing are far-reaching, and risk becoming an 
existential threat.      
A quick comparison with the prevailing legal and political climate in 2000, the year before the events 
of 9/11, helps to demonstrate the scale and nature of the current crisis. In that year, the coming into 
effect of the HRA in UK law could be viewed as marking the moment when human rights law became 
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a settled feature of the legal landscape of virtually all liberal democratic states: before then, the UK 
had been the single most prominent example of a democracy which did not make provision for an 
agreed charter of fundamental rights to be enforceable though its domestic courts system, but the 
HRA changed all that. By incorporating ECHR rights into UK law, it also affirmed that ECHR 
compliance had become ‘normalised’ across Europe: in effect, the European Court of Human Rights 
had become established as the ultimate guarantor of respect for rights, democracy and rule of law 
throughout the Council of Europe zone. In Latin America, the Inter-American system of rights 
protection had come to play a similar role. Across most of the Commonwealth, domestic systems of 
rights protection, substantially influenced by international standards, had begun to put down deep 
roots. At the UN level, the International Criminal Court was in the process of being established, 
moves were afoot to establish what subsequently became the UN Human Rights Council, and the 
special rapporteur system was coming into full bloom.  
This is not to say that states necessarily complied with their human rights commitments, or that the 
expansion of human rights law at national and international level was uncontroversial. For example, 
sharp differences of view existed about how exactly to balance rights protection with respect for the 
principle of democratic self-governance, and in particular whether courts or elected legislatures 
should enjoy the ‘final say’ over contested issues of rights interpretation. However, in general, it was 
possible to speak of an emerging consensus across most of the liberal democratic world that the 
legal protection of human rights should form a core element of national constitutional law and also 
receive substantial protection at international level.1  
But, if we flash forward to 2016, things look very different. Human rights law is now on the back 
foot, and its growth and expansion over the last few decades is now attracting serious backlash. This 
manifests itself in different ways, which taken together add up to the makings of a full-blown 
legitimacy crisis.  
The Nature of the Threat 
To start with, the influence exerted by regional/international human rights standards over national 
law and policy is increasingly being challenged. International adjudicatory bodies are now regularly 
accused of over-extending their mandate, with their critics accusing them in particular of (i) failing to 
respect the rule of law by adopting an unduly expansionist interpretation of the scope and substance 
of human rights guarantees, and (ii) of failing to respect the constraints on their authority that 
should flow from their lack of a clear democratic mandate derived from a specific national demos.2  
The UK debate over prisoner voting rights following the Hirst v UK judgment3 is an example of this 
trend, which is also reflected in the desire of the UK government to reduce the influence of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence over national law via the replacement of the HRA with a new Bill of Rights. 
Originally confined to the UK, this scepticism about Strasbourg has spread rapidly to other European 
jurisdictions. Russia has enacted legislation requiring its courts to set aside Strasbourg judgments 
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when they conflict with national norms,4 while prominent politicians in the Netherlands, France and 
other states have disparaged the ECHR and advocated measures to restrict the influence of the 
Strasbourg Court over national law.5 Nor is this trend confined to the ECHR. In recent years, the 
views of UN human rights bodies have been subject to severe criticism by ministers in supposedly 
rights-leading states like Canada and the UK.6 There are signs that Latin American countries are 
beginning to push back against the authority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.7  
In general, it is becoming commonplace for the legitimacy of international human rights standards to 
be called into question, with both the interpretative approaches of supranational adjudicatory 
bodies and concerns about national/popular sovereignty being invoked as a basis for departing from 
international norms.  However, these lines of attack are also beginning to be directed against 
domestic courts charged with enforcing compliance with national rights standards. The UK again 
presents an interesting case-study in this regard, with harsh media and political criticism of the 
legitimacy of the rights jurisprudence of the European courts setting the scene for later assaults on 
the integrity of the case-law of the English courts.8 Human rights commissions, rights-focused NGOs 
and even national and supranational governmental institutions charged with promoting respect for 
rights are all vulnerable to similar accusations of mandate-stretch and/or disregarding the 
democratic will – which in the eyes of some critics also constitute an inherent design flaw in legally 
enforceable human rights instruments in general.9  
There is nothing new in these criticisms. But, significantly, they go beyond the time-worn argument 
that elected politicians should enjoy the ‘final say’ over contested issues relating to the 
interpretation and application of human rights.10 Instead, they call into question the legitimacy of 
much of existing human rights law, even when it forms part of a constitutional system like that of 
the UK where Parliament has the ultimate authority to decide what qualifies as a breach of such a 
right. It is generally acknowledged, even by its harshest critics, that human rights law may have some 
residual value. However, the expansion of the scope and substance of human rights law over the last 
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few decades is increasingly framed as an example of ‘mission creep’: the claim is now repeatedly 
made that national and international human rights guarantees have been stretched beyond their 
original minimalist function as a last-ditch bastion against blatant rights abuses, and turned instead 
into a Trojan Horse for particular liberal-legalist conceptions of what constitutes ‘just’ law. 
Furthermore, this ‘mission creep’ is alleged to place excessive constraints on political freedom of 
choice, in a manner that undermines popular self-government.  
Different versions of these arguments exist – some framed in relatively crude terms, others set out 
with a high level of sophistication.11 But they share two common and inter-related lines of attack, 
which have come to occupy a dominant role in the debate: namely that human rights law has 
overreached itself, and now functions in a way that is different to reconcile with rule of law and 
democratic first principles.  
The Need to Respond 
These arguments resonate in the current political context, which is marked by an intense backlash 
against ‘unaccountable elites’ and the apparent draining away of power from national governments 
to supranational institutional structures such as the EU. In this climate, it is easy to characterise 
judicial enforcement of abstract rights norms – and in particular enforcement by international 
human rights courts - as being anti-democratic. Given that human rights are widely understood to 
constitute minimal guarantees against egregious state abuses, the charge of ‘mission creep’ also 
strikes a chord: human rights law is vulnerable to the perception that it represents a takeover by 
left-leaning lawyers of matters best left to be determined by elected politicians. 
The backlash against transnational modes of governance – manifested in particular by the Brexit 
vote, Trump’s electoral success and the emergence in general of a newly aggressive strain of 
nationalist populism12 in states as distinct and far-apart as Hungary, Turkey and the Philippines – also 
appears to have diluted the pressure on national governments to be seen to respect their 
international legal commitments.  The threat that states will attract international disapproval if they 
disregard or withdraw from their human rights commitments appears to have less force now than it 
might have done in the past, as evidenced by how senior politicians in a number of European states 
now talking openly about ECHR withdrawal. Until recently, states were expected to show at least 
formal respect for human rights standards, as part of signalling their commitment to the post-1989 
system of global governance: however, this governance system is now beginning to crumble, and 
states are freer now to push against constraints upon their freedom of action than they were before.   
This risks depriving rights enthusiasts of a weapon they use frequently to defend human rights law, 
namely references to the obligations of states under international law to protect such rights - 
suddenly, these obligations no longer look set in stone.  Similarly, attempts to justify human rights 
law by reference to the need to respect democratic principles and the rule of law also risk sounding 
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hollow, given that critics of human rights law are now invoking these self-same principles to criticise 
its current scope and functioning. 
All this means that rights enthusiasts will have to be much smarter and more sophisticated in 
defending human rights law than they necessarily have been in the past. Clinging to the old verities, 
by repeatedly invoking the requirements of international human rights standards and reiterating 
over and over that rights protection is essential to secure respect for democracy and rule of law, will 
not be enough. Nor will it be enough to dismiss all the arguments of rights sceptics with weary 
disdain. Such arguments are admittedly often poor and under-developed, being based on simplistic 
appeals to reductionist ideas of democracy and legal certainty. But some have more substance than 
others – and, in general, they are attracting an audience.  
Meeting the Challenge 
Rights enthusiasts are thus going to have to start engaging seriously with the different lines of attack 
coming their way, and start building a detailed and comprehensive defence of existing human rights 
law. This can be done, but it will require defenders of human rights law to confront some of the 
ambiguity that exists about its scope, substance and purpose – and in particular to respond to the 
charges of ‘mission creep’ and counter-democratic overreach. There is a need to provide a 
substantive justification of how human rights law has expanded its reach over the last few decades, 
to demonstrate the democratic bona fides of this area of law, and to show how it enhances the 
functioning, legitimacy and integrity of legal systems at large.  
To do this, rights enthusiasts can start by pointing to how national and international human rights 
law has developed over time through judicial interpretation of democratically-approved texts, with 
courts clarifying the scope and substance of the abstract provisions of human rights instruments 
through standard procedures of legal reasoning. Human rights law has thus grown and evolved in a 
manner similar to how common law standards grow and evolve over time, i.e. through an 
incremental process of applying rights norms to concrete fact situations in a manner consistent with 
already established legal rules. In other words, the expansion of human rights law resembles the 
expansion of English tort law, administrative law and other core areas of the common law.  
Furthermore, as Bernard Williams noted, the operation of law often helps to refine unexamined 
moral beliefs and challenge embedded assumptions about what qualifies as ‘just’ or ‘legitimate’ 
behaviour.13 The expansion of human rights law has often been driven in this way by the process of 
legal reasoning clarifying what exactly should qualify as ‘torture’, or a ‘disproportionate interference 
with free speech’, or a violation of the right to a fair trial.  
As a consequence, the ‘mission creep’ argument can be challenged. Human rights law has expanded 
over time through the unfolding of legal reasoning processes that are familiar and wholly accepted 
elsewhere, and which we rely upon as societies to deepen our understanding of what qualifies as 
just treatment. However, this is does not mean that the scope and content of rights guarantees can 
be stretched willy-nilly. The wording of their text, taken together with the standard interpretative 
rules that constrain the freedom of courts in applying legal norms, limit the reach of human rights 
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law – and therefore help to ensure its legitimacy, as Paul Daly has argued in relation to 
administrative law.14  
In making such arguments, it is important to acknowledge that human rights law can and arguably 
has been at times extended too far. Like other forms of law, interpretative boundaries have not 
always been respected. But the idea that the extended reach of current human rights law is 
generally excessive, on the basis that it departs from a minimal set of guarantees against grotesque 
abuses of state power, is an argument that is difficult to sustain. Furthermore, the claim that rights 
instruments were only ever intended to provide such minimalist guarantees is also highly dubious – 
as demonstrated by Danny Nicol’s research into the origins of the ECHR.15 It also bears noting that 
the scope and substance of existing human rights law has been repeatedly endorsed by many of the 
same governments who now cavil about its reach: for example, UK criticism of the purposive 
interpretative approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights usually ignores how the 
outlines of the Court’s approach were clearly laid down in the 1970s and 1980s, after which the UK 
repeatedly renewed the jurisdiction of the Court before accepting it on a permanent basis in 1994 
with its ratification of Protocol 11 to the ECHR and encouraging the post-Communist states of 
Central and Eastern Europe to do the same in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
Turning to the ‘democratic overreach’ argument, rights enthusiasts need to emphasise the manner 
in which human rights law plugs accountability gaps that would otherwise exist in national and 
international law and adds a valuable new dimension to the regulatory capacity of legal systems to 
control and steer the behaviour of public bodies. In the UK, the campaign mounted by ‘Act for the 
Act’ in defence of the HRA is a model of such an approach, stressing as it does the added value 
human rights law brings to law’s capacity to secure fair treatment for vulnerable people.16 It also 
needs to be emphasised that legal rights protection is not hermetically sealed off from the give-and-
take of political debate: viewed in the round, human rights law may orient and constrain the 
functioning of the democratic process in certain limited ways – but it is lazy hyperbole to 
characterise it as undercutting or nullifying the principle of democratic self-government.17  
Rights enthusiasts also need to make the argument that legal rights protection often operates in a 
way that reinforces the principle of democratic self-government, at both national and international 
levels. Healthy, functioning democracies balance what Habermas describes as popular ‘will-
formation’ with a commitment to respecting the dignity and status of individual citizens:18 human 
rights law helps societies to strike this balance, by identifying situations where the scales have been 
unfairly tilted against the individual.19 In addition, it also plays a part in addressing a latent tension 
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that lies at the heart of democratic governance, namely the way in which certain groups of people – 
such as non-citizens – are denied an opportunity to participate in shaping the common rules that 
govern the society in which they live. Benhabib identifies this as an inherent ‘paradox’ that ‘can 
never be fully resolved in democracies’, but whose impact can be ‘mitigated through the 
renegotiation and reiteration of the dual commitments to human rights and sovereign self-
determination’.20 Human rights law thus helps to contribute to this negotiation process by protecting 
non-nationals and other groups who tend to be marginalised within the functioning of national 
democratic systems - ultimately enhancing both their stability and their legitimacy.   
Conclusion 
Human rights law faces a legitimacy crisis. It is being attacked at a fundamental level, perhaps best 
illustrated by the extraordinary claim made recently by the think-tank Policy Exchange (via its 
Judicial Power Project initiative) in written evidence submitted to the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights to the effect that ‘…much international human rights law [is] largely inimical both to the rule 
of law and to democratic self-government’.21 Rights enthusiasts need to respond to this challenge, 
by engaging head-on with such attacks.  
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